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1 Introduction
Recently there are two advances in expanding the frontier of sufficient conditions for the
existence of stable outcomes in the many-to-one matching with contracts model. One is
achieved by Hatfield and Kominers (2016) who propose a condition called substitutable
completability. Simply speaking, a choice function is substitutably completable if it has a
completion in the many-to-many framework that satisfies substitutability (Hatfield and
Milgrom, 2005). Hatfield and Kominers prove that if the choice functions of all firms
have substitutable completions that satisfy irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC; Aygu¨n
and So¨nmez, 2013), then the worker-proposing cumulative offer algorithm can find stable
outcomes.
The other advance is achieved by Hatfield et al. (2015). They propose the notion of
observable offer processes, which, simply speaking, are the sequences of contracts that
can appear in the worker-proposing cumulative offer algorithm. They call a firm’s choice
function observably substitutable if it satisfies substitutability on observable offer processes
and IRC. They prove that if all firms have observably substitutable choice functions, the
worker-proposing cumulative offer algorithm can find stable outcomes.
Before this note it is not clear how these two advances are related. In particular, even
though a choice function has a substitutable completion that satisfies IRC, the choice
function itself may not satisfy IRC. So it is not observably substitutable. On the other
hand, Hatfield et al. show that an observably substitutable choice function may not have
a substitutable completion. So the two advances seem independent of each other.
In this note we prove that if a choice function has a substitutable completion that
satisfies IRC, then it must satisfy both substitutability and IRC on its observable offer
processes. We call choice functions having this property weakly observably substitutable.
We prove that weakly observable substitutability is sufficient for stable outcomes to exist.
Since this condition also subsumes observable substitutability, the above two advances
are unified in this note.
Inspired by the substitutable completion idea we conjecture that if all firms’ choice
functions have weakly observably substitutable completions, then stable outcomes may
also exist. Interestingly, we find that a choice function has a completion that is weakly
observably substitutable if and only if the choice function is weakly observable substi-
tutable by itself. So the conjecture is indeed correct. This also implies that we cannot
2
extend the substitutable completion idea beyond weakly observable substitutability.
We are also interested in the relation between unilateral substitutability introduced
by Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and substitutable completability. Hatfield et al. show that
unilateral substitutability is a special case of observable substitutability. In this note we
constructively prove that if a choice function satisfies unilateral substitutability and IRC,
it must have a substitutable completion. This result is more general than that of Kadam
(2014) since he only proves the result for choice functions derived from preferences.
In the literature there are multiple sufficient conditions for the existence of stable
outcomes in the many-to-one matching with contracts model. In particular, Hatfield et
al propose another sufficient condition called observable substitutability across workers,
which is weaker than observable substitutability. In this note we similarly define weakly
observable substitutability across workers by requiring IRC hold only on observable offer
processes. We prove that it is also a sufficient condition for stable outcomes to exist. In
the following graph we summarize the relations between multiple sufficient conditions.
It also clarifies our contribution in this note. In the graph “condition a → condition b”
means that condition a implies condition b.
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Figure 1: Relations between multiple sufficient conditions.
In Section 2 we define the standard many-to-one matching with contracts model. In
Section 3 we define weakly observable substitutability and weakly observable substitutability
across workers and prove that they are sufficient conditions. In Section 4 we prove that
substitutable completability and IRC imply weakly observable substitutability. In Section
5 we prove that unilateral substitutability and IRC imply substitutable completability. In
Section 5 we have some discussions.
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2 Model
We introduce the standard many-to-one matching with contracts model. There are a
finite set F of firms and a finite set W of workers, with I ≡ F ∪W being the set of all
agents. Firms sign contracts with workers, but each worker can at most one contract. Let
X be the finite set of all contracts. For each contract x ∈ X, wx and fx are respectively
the worker and the firm involved in x. For any subset of contracts Z ⊆ X, Zi is the set
of contracts in Z that involve any agent i ∈ I, FZ is the set of firms involved in Z, WZ
is the set of workers involved in Z, and IZ ≡ FZ ∪WZ is the set of all agents involved in
Z. A subset of contracts A ⊆ X is called an outcome, and it is feasible if |Aw| ≤ 1 for all
w ∈ W .
Each worker w has a strict preference relation w over Xw ∪ {∅}, the set of all
contracts involving w and being unemployed. Every preference relation w induces a
choice function Cw such that Cw(Z) ≡ arg maxx∈Z w for all Z ⊆ Xw ∪ {∅}. Each firm
f ∈ F has a choice function Cf such that for any Z ⊆ X, Cf (Z) ⊆ Zf contains at most
one contract with each worker. In the terminology of Kominers (2012) we call such choice
functions unitary. Let CW ≡ {Cw}w∈W and CF ≡ {Cf}f∈F . The rejection function of
each agent i ∈ I is denoted by Ri such that Ri(Z) ≡ Zi\Ci(Z) for all Z ⊆ X. For all
Z ⊆ X and all f ∈ F , we use CWf (Z) to denote the set of workers involved in Cf (Z).
An outcome A ⊆ X is individually rational if for all i ∈ I, Ci(A) = Ai. So an
individually rational outcome must be feasible. An outcome A is blocked by a set of
contracts Z ⊆ X if Z ∩A = ∅ and for all i ∈ IZ , Zi ⊆ Ci(A∪Z). An outcome A is stable
if it is individually rational and unblocked.
There are two conditions of choice functions that are important in matching with
contracts: substitutability and irrevelence of rejected contracts (Hatfield and Milgrom,
2005; Aygu¨n and So¨nmez, 2013). If all firms’ choice functions satisfy both conditions,
then stable outcomes exist.
Definition 1. A firm’s choice function Cf is substitutable if for all Z ′ ⊆ Z ⊆ X,
Rf (Z
′)\Rf (Z) = ∅.
Definition 2. A firm’s choice function Cf satisfies irrelevance of rejected contracts
if for all x ∈ Z ⊆ X, if x /∈ Cf (Z), then Cf (Z) = Cf (Z\{x}).
In next section we will propose two new conditions that are weaker than substitutabil-
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ity and IRC but are still sufficient for stable outcomes to exist. We will use the worker-
proposing cumulative offer (COM) algorithm to prove the existence of stable outcomes.
The formal definition of COM is below.
The worker-proposing cumulative offer algorithm:
• Step 0: Choose an arbitrary ordering BW of all workers. Initialize the set of
cumulative offers that firms have received by step 0 as A0 ≡ ∅.
• Step t ≥ 1: Consider the set of workers who want to make an offer at step t:
W t = {w ∈ W : w /∈ CWF (At−1), xtw ≡ arg max
x∈Xw∪{∅}\At−1
w 6= ∅},
If W t 6= ∅, let the worker w ∈ W t who is ranked highest in BW makes the offer
xtw. Then let At ≡ At−1 ∪ {xtw}. So CF (At) ≡ ∪f∈FCf (Atf ) is the set of accepted
contracts.
If W t = ∅, then the algorithm terminates and the outcome is CF (At−1).
3 Weakly Observable Substitutability (Across Work-
ers)
In this section we propose the notions of weakly observable substitutability and weakly
observable substitutability across workers. To define them we first introduce some notions.
An offer process for firm f is a finite sequence of distinct contracts x = (x1, · · · , xM)
such that for all m = 1, · · · ,M , xm ∈ Xf . For all m = 1, · · · ,M , we denote xm ≡
(x1, · · · , xm) and call it a subprocess of x. We call x observable if for all m = 1, · · · ,M ,
wxm /∈ CWf ({x1, · · · , xm−1}). That is, the worker involved in xm is different from all
workers involved in Cf ({x1, · · · , xm−1}).
A firm’s choice function Cf satisfies no observable violation of substitutability (NOVS)
if for any two observable offer processes x,x′ for f such that x′ is a subprocess of x,
Rf (x′)\Rf (x) = ∅.1 In a weaker notion Cf satisfies no substantial violation of substi-
tutability (NSVS) if for any two observable offer processes x,x′ for f such that x′ is a
1If x = (x1, · · · , xM ), we use Rf (x) to denote Rf ({x1, · · · , xM}). In the original definition of Hat-
field et al. (2015), their “if” condition is stated as “for any observable offer process (x1, · · · , xM ) for f ,
Rf ({x1, · · · , xM−1})\Rf ({x1, · · · , xM}) = ∅.” This condition is equivalent to the one in this note.
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subprocess of x, if x ∈ Rf (x′)\Rf (x) 6= ∅, then wx ∈ CWf (x′). Then Cf is observably sub-
stitutable if it satisfies NOVS and IRC, and Cf is observably substitutable across workers
if it satisfies NSVS and IRC.
Now we define a weak version of IRC which only requires IRC hold on observable offer
processes.
Definition 3. A firm’s choice function Cf satisfies observable IRC if for all observable
offer process x for f and all Z ⊆ Rf (x), Cf (x) = Cf (x\Z).
A choice function must satisfy IRC if it is derived from a strict preference relation.
In other words, if a choice function satisfies observable IRC but not IRC, it cannot be
derived from a strict preference relation.
Then we define the weaker versions of observable substitutability and observable sub-
stitutability across workers by replacing IRC with observable IRC.
Definition 4. A firm’s choice function Cf is weakly observably substitutable if it
satifies NOVS and observable IRC.
Definition 5. A firm’s choice function Cf is weakly observably substitutable across
workers if it satifies NSVS and observable IRC.
Note that weakly observable substitutability across workers is weaker than weakly ob-
servable substitutability. In the following we prove the existence of stable outcomes when
the choice functions of all firms are weakly observably substitutable across workers. The
proof is almost same as that of Hatfield et al.
Theorem 1. If the choice function of each firm is weakly observably substitutable across
workers, then the outcome of the worker-proposing cumulative offer algorithm is stable.
Proof. Let T be the last step of COM, then AT is the set of cumulative offers received by
all firms. Let Y = CF (AT ) ≡ ∪f∈FCf (ATf ), then Y is the outcome of COM. So we need
to prove that Y is stable.
First, we prove that Y is feasible. Suppose the contrary that there exist two contracts
x, x′ ∈ Y such that wx = wx′ = w and without loss of generality x w x′. So w must
propose x earlier than proposing x′. Suppose w proposes x′ at step t, then it must be
that x ∈ Rfx(At−1fx ). That is, x is not accepted at the end of step t − 1. However,
x ∈ Y implies that x /∈ Rfx(ATfx). Since At−1fx is a subprocess of ATfx and Cfx satisfies
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NSVS, w ∈ CWfx (At−1fx ). That is, there exists a contract x′′ ∈ X such that wx′′ = w and
x′′ ∈ Cfx(At−1fx ). But this implies that w should not make an offer at step t, which is a
contradiction.
Second, we prove that Y is individually rational. Since all workers must propose only
acceptable contracts to firms, every contract in Y is acceptable to the relevant worker.
Since Y is also feasible, it must be that for every w, Cw(Y ) = Yw. By construction Y is
individually rational for firms.
Lastly, we prove that Y is unblocked. Consider any set Z ⊆ X such that Z ∩ Y = ∅
and Zw ⊆ Cw(Y ∪ Z) for all w ∈ WZ . For all w ∈ WZ , Zw must be a single contract
and Zw w Yw. So w must propose Zw at some earlier step and is rejected before step
T . Hence, Zw ∈ RfZw (ATfZw ) ⊆ ATfZw . Since ATfZw is an observable offer process for fZw
and CfZw satisfies observable IRC, YfZw = CfZw (A
T
fZw
) = CfZw (YfZw ∪ RfZw (ATfZw )) =
CfZw (YfYw ∪ ZfZw ). So Z is not a blocking set.
4 Substitutable Completability and IRC Imply Weakly
Observable Substitutability
Hatfield and Kominers (2016) have an innovative observation that although the choice
functions of some firms are not substitutable, the firms may have underlying “substi-
tutable preferences” which cannot be expressed in the many-to-one framework.
Definition 6. C¯f is a completion of Cf if for all Z ⊆ X, either C¯f (Z) = Cf (Z) or there
exists distinct z, z′ ∈ C¯f (Z) such that wz = wz′. Then Cf is substitutably completable
if it has a substitutable completion.
Hatfield and Kominers prove that if the choice functions of all firms have substitutable
completions that satisfy IRC, then stable outcomes exist. However, although the substi-
tutable completion of a choice function satisfies IRC, the choice function itself may not
satisfy IRC. We provide a simple example to illustrate this fact.
Example 1. A firm f has a choice function Cf shown in Table 1. wx = wxˆ = w1 and
wy = w2. C¯f is a completion of Cf .
Here (x, xˆ) and (x, xˆ, y) are unobservable offer processes. C¯f is substitutable and sat-
isfies IRC. However, Cf does not satisfy IRC since xˆ /∈ Cf ({x, xˆ, y}) but Cf ({x, xˆ, y}) =
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offer set Z Cf (Z) C¯f (Z)
{a} : ∀a ∈ {x, xˆ, y} {a} {a}
{x, y} {x, y} {x, y}
{x, xˆ} {x} {x, xˆ}
{xˆ, y} {xˆ} {xˆ}
{x, xˆ, y} {y} {x, xˆ}
Table 1: Example 1
{y} 6= {x, y} = Cf ({x, xˆ, y}\{xˆ}). So Cf is not observably substitutable.
We will prove that if a choice function has a substitutable completion that satisfies
IRC, it must satisfy observable IRC and NOVS. So it is weakly observably substitutable.
Actually we will show that it is a corollary of a more general result. Since weakly observ-
able substitutability (across workers) is sufficient for stable outcomes to exist, inspired by
the substitutable completion idea we conjecture that if each firm’s choice function Cf has
a completion C¯f which is weakly observably substitutable (across workers), then stable
outcomes may also exist. Because C¯f may not be unitary, we cannot apply Theorem
1 to prove this conjecture. However, we will prove that C¯f and Cf have the same set
of observable offer processes, and for every observable offer process x, C¯f (x) = Cf (x).
Then if C¯f is weakly observably substitutable (across workers), Cf must be also weakly
observably substitutable (across workers). Then Theorem 1 implies that the conjecture is
correct.
To prove the above result we first prove two lemmas.
Lemma 1. Let C¯f be a completion of a firm’s choice function Cf . If C¯f satisfies NSVS,
then for all observable offer process x for C¯f , C¯f (x) is feasible.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Suppose for some observable offer process x =
(x1, · · · , xM) for C¯f , C¯f (x) is not feasible. Then there exist two distinct contracts xi, xj ∈
C¯f (x) with i < j such that wxi = wxj . Since x is observable, xi ∈ R¯f ({x1, · · · , xj−1}).
But xi /∈ R¯f (x), so xi ∈ R¯f ({x1, · · · , xj−1})\R¯f (x). Then since C¯f satisfies NSVS,
there exists xk ∈ C¯f ({x1, · · · , xj−1}) such that wxk = wxi = wxj , which contradicts the
observability of (x1, · · · , xj). So C¯f (x) is feasible.
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Lemma 2. Let C¯f be a completion of a firm’s choice function Cf . If C¯f satisfies NSVS,
then C¯f and Cf have the same set of observable offer processes and for every observable
offer process x, C¯f (x) = Cf (x).
Proof. First, for any observable offer process x for C¯f , by Lemma 1, C¯f (x) is feasible. So
Cf (x) = C¯f (x). This implies that x is also observable for Cf .
Second, for any observable offer process x = {x1, · · · , xM} for Cf , we prove by in-
duction that it is also observable for C¯f . It is obvious that Cf ({x1}) = barCf ({x1})
since C¯f ({x1}) must be feasible. Suppose Cf ({x1, · · · , xi}) = C˜f ({x1, · · · , xi}) for all
i ≤ m < M . Since (x1, · · · , xm+1) is observable for Cf , wxm+1 /∈ CWf ({x1, · · · , xm}) =
C¯Wf ({x1, · · · , xm}). So (x1, · · · , xm+1) is also observable for C¯f . By Lemma 1 C˜f ({x1, · · · , xm+1})
is feasible. So Cf ({x1, · · · , xm+1}) = C¯f ({x1, · · · , xm+1}). By induction x is observable
for C¯f , and Cf (x) = C˜f (x).
Now we are ready to prove the main result in this section.
Proposition 1. A firm’s choice function Cf has a weakly observably substitutable (across
workers) completion if and only if Cf is weakly observably substitutable (across workers).
Proof. Let C¯f be a completion of Cf that is weakly observably substitutable (across
workers). Then by Lemma 2, for every observable offer process x for Cf , C¯f (x) = Cf (x).
Then if C¯f satisfies NOVS, for any two observable offer processes x,x′ for f such that x′
is a subprocess of x, R¯f (x′)\R¯f (x) = ∅. This implies that Rf (x′)\Rf (x) = ∅. So Cf also
satisfies NOVS.
If C¯f satisfies NSVS, for any two observable offer processes x,x′ for Cf such that
x′ is a subprocess of x, if R¯f (x′)\R¯f (x) 6= ∅, for every x ∈ R¯f (x′)\R¯f (x) there exists
x′ ∈ C¯f (x′) such that wx′ = wx. Since C¯f (x) = Cf (x) and C¯f (x′) = Cf (x′), Cf must
have the same property. So Cf also satisfies NSVS.
For any observable offer process x for Cf and any Z ⊆ Rf (x), since Cf (x) = C¯f (x),
C¯f (x) is feasible and Z ⊆ R¯f (x). Since x is also observable for C¯f and C¯f satisfies
observable IRC, C¯f (x) = C¯f (x\Z). So C¯f (x\Z) is also feasible, which implies that
C¯f (x\Z) = Cf (x\Z). Hence Cf (x) = Cf (x\Z), which implies that Cf satisfies observable
IRC. So if C¯f is weakly observably substitutable (across workers), Cf must be also weakly
observably substitutable (across workers).
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Of course if Cf is weakly observably substitutable (across workers), it can be a com-
pletion of itself.
Since a substitutable completion that satisfies IRC is weakly observably substitutable,
the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 1. If a firm’s choice function Cf has a substitutable completion that satisfies
IRC, Cf is weakly observably substitutable.
5 Unilateral Substitutability and IRC Imply Substi-
tutable Completability
In this section we show that if a choice function satisfies unilateral substitutability and
IRC, it must has a substitutable completion.
Definition 7. A firm’s choice function Cf is unilaterally substitutable if for all Z ⊆ X
and all x, z ∈ X\Z, if z ∈ Rf (Z ∪ {z}) and z /∈ Rf (Z ∪ {x, z}), then there exists z′ ∈ Z
such that wz = wz′.
Proposition 2. If a firm’s choice function Cf satisfies unilateral substitutability and
IRC, then it is substitutably completable.
To prove the proposition we first prove a lemma
Lemma 3. If a firm’s choice function Cf satisfies unilateral substitutability and IRC,
then for all Z ⊆ X and all x, z ∈ X\Z, if z ∈ Rf (Z ∪ {z}) and z /∈ Rf (Z ∪ {x, z}), then
there exists zˆ ∈ Cf (Z ∪ {z}) such that wzˆ = wz.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Let w = wz. Suppose there does not exist zˆ ∈ Cf (Z ∪
{z}) such that wzˆ = w, then it means that Zw ⊆ Rf (Z∪{z}). Since z ∈ Cf (Z∪{x, z}) and
Cf is unitary, we also have Zw ⊆ Rf (Z ∪{x, z}). Since Cf satisfies IRC, z ∈ Rf (Z ∪{z})
and z /∈ Rf (Z ∪ {x, z}) imply that z ∈ Rf (Z ′ ∪ {z}) and z /∈ Rf (Z ′ ∪ {x, z}) where
Z ′ = Z\Zw. However, by the unilateral substitutability of Cf these imply that there
exists z′ ∈ Z ′ such that wz′ = w, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2:
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We construct a substitutable completion C¯f of Cf . At step 0 below we let C¯f (Z) =
Cf (Z) for all Z ⊆ Xf . Then there may exist multiple violations of substitutability in C¯f .
At each following step we identify some violations of substitutability and correct them
by updating C¯f . At the end of the procedure we obtain the choice function C¯f which is
substitutable.
• Step 0: Define C¯0f (Z) ≡ Cf (Z) for all Z ⊆ Xf . It is obvious that C¯0f satisfies
unilateral substitutability and IRC.
• Step 1: We consider all Z $ Xf such that R¯0f (Z)\R¯0f (Xf ) 6= ∅. Lemma 3 says that
for any z ∈ R¯0f (Z)\R¯0f (Xf ) there exists z′ ∈ C¯0f (Z) such that wz′ = wz. So C¯0f (Z)∪
(R¯0f (Z)\R¯0f (Xf )) is not feasible. Then we define C¯1f (Z) ≡ C¯0f (Z)∪(R¯0f (Z)\R¯0f (Xf )).
For all other Z, define C¯1f (Z) ≡ C¯0f (Z).
By this definition there is no violation of substitutability associated with Xf in C¯1f .
• Step k ≥ 2: We consider all Y $ Xf such that |Y | = |Xf | − k + 1 and all Z $ Y
such that R¯k−1f (Z)\R¯k−1f (Y ) 6= ∅. By our construction C¯k−1f always chooses weakly
more contracts than C¯k
′−1
f from the same set of contracts if k > k
′. So for any
z ∈ R¯k−1f (Z)\R¯k−1f (Y ), z ∈ R¯k−1f (Z) implies that z ∈ R¯0f (Z) = Rf (Z). Now we
prove that z /∈ Rf (Y ).
Suppose the contrary that z ∈ Rf (Y ). Then z /∈ R¯k−1f (Y ) implies that at some
earlier step k′ we have z ∈ R¯k′−1f (Y ) but z /∈ R¯k
′−1
f (Yˆ ) for some Y $ Yˆ ⊆ Xf
so that we define C¯k′f (Y ) ≡ C¯k
′−1
f (Y ) ∪ (R¯k
′−1
f (Y )\R¯k
′−1
f (Yˆ )). However, at step k
′
we should also have z ∈ R¯k′−1f (Z) since z ∈ R¯k−1f (Z) and k′ < k. Then Z $ Yˆ
and R¯k
′−1
f (Z)\R¯k
′−1
f (Yˆ ) 6= ∅ imply that at step k′ we must also define C¯k
′
f (Z) ≡
C¯k
′−1
f (Z) ∪ (R¯k
′−1
f (Z)\R¯k
′−1
f (Yˆ )). This means that z ∈ C¯k
′
f (Z), which contradicts
z ∈ R¯k−1f (Z). So z /∈ Rf (Y ).
Hence R¯k−1f (Z)\R¯k−1f (Y ) ⊆ Rf (Z)\Rf (Y ) 6= ∅. Then Lemma 3 says that for
any z ∈ R¯k−1f (Z)\R¯k−1f (Y ) ⊆ Rf (Z)\Rf (Y ), there exists z′ ∈ Cf (Z) such that
wz′ = wz. So Cf (Z)∪(R¯k−1f (Z)\R¯k−1f (Y )) is not feasible. If C¯k−1f (Z) = Cf (Z), then
C¯k−1f (Z)∪(R¯k−1f (Z)\R¯k−1f (Y )) is not feasible. If C¯k−1f (Z) 6= Cf (Z), by our construc-
tion C¯k−1f (Z) is already not feasible. So in any case C¯
k−1
f (Z)∪ (R¯k−1f (Z)\R¯k−1f (Y ))
is not feasible. Define C¯kf (Z) ≡ C¯k−1f (Z) ∪ (R¯k−1f (Z)\R¯k−1f (Y )). For all other Z,
define C¯kf (Z) ≡ C¯k−1f (Z).
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By this definition there is no violation of substitutability associated with any Y $
Xf such that |Y | ≥ |Xf | − k + 1 in C¯kf .
When k = |Xf |, we stop the procedure. Then C¯ |Xf |f is the choice function we want.
Let C¯f ≡ C¯ |Xf |f . C¯f is a completion of Cf since from the above procedure we know that
C¯f (Z) 6= Cf (Z) only when C¯f (Z) is not feasible. C¯f is substitutable because we eliminate
all violations of substitutability in the above procedure. 
The choice function C¯f we construct in the above proof may not satisfy IRC. However,
since it is substitutable, by Lemma 2 we know that the choice function Cf must satisfy
NOVS. Since Cf further satisfies IRC, Cf is weakly observably substitutable.
6 Discussion
Besides the existence of stable outcomes, Hatfield et al. (2015) also prove that observable
substitutability and other two conditions are sufficient for COM to be strategy-proof.
In this note we relax IRC to observable IRC. It is an open question that whether the
strategy-proofness of COM still holds if IRC is replaced by observable IRC in their proof.
In our definition of COM we arbitrarily choose an ordering of all workers according to
which workers make offers. However, the outcome of COM is actually independent of this
ordering if all firms’ choice functions are weakly observably substitutable across workers.
This fact can be proved in the entirely same way as the similar result of Hatfield et al.
Lastly, in Section 5 we construct a substitutable completion of a unilaterally substi-
tutable choice function that satisfies IRC. However, the completion may not satisfy IRC.
It is also an open question that whether there exists a substitutable completion that
satisfies IRC, and if yes, how to construct it.
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